"If the government grants use immunity to a witness, it is prohibited from thereafter prosecuting the witness based on the testimony it compels or anything derived (directly or indirectly) from it. In other words, witnesses who admit to a crime while testifying under use immunity can't have their statements "used" against them in any prosecution for that crime.
The government can, however, still try to prosecute that crime, as long as it uses evidence from other places. Under the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Kastigar v. United States, prosecutors bear the "heavy burden" of affirmatively establishing that the evidence against an immunized witness is derived from independent and legitimate sources, not the witness." Slate magazine
Much is made of the decision to try the underpants bomber in criminal court because of issues related to interrogation of him regarding related plots and other information on the Al Queda cell in Yemen. Anything he says could be used against those people not being interrogated, but not against him in a court of law. Miranda is a standard of admisability, not a prohibition on interrogating a prisoner. The problem becomes separating the interrogation from the evidence gathering for the purpose of trial. See recent DOJ case on Blackwater guards for murding 17 Iraqi civilians. In a terrorism case such as the underpants bomber, it would seem very simple to separate the prosecution evidence from any information gained for purposes of anti-terrorism. We already legitimately have almost all the evidence we need to prosecute him for attempting to blow up the plane. Any information he might provide [to intelligence interrogators] regarding other plots or background on Yemen terror would appear to be irrelevant to the bomb prosecution and therefore, it would appear there would be no bar, as long as the interrogators didn't share the information gained with the prosecutors. Am I missing something?
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